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Abstract 
This paper adds to the body of knowledge by providing a data based proof on the effect of foreign 
interest rate and monetary policy on credit to the private sector provided by domestic banks in 
developing countries. This subject matter is significant for a developing economy due to the fact 
that about 79 percent of total credit to the private sector in these set of countries are provisioned 
through credits by banks, therefore its movements have important effects on the stability of the 
financial system. Using the Structural Vector Autoregressive method, this paper found that 
domestic credit provided by banks in home country is affected by interest rates from abroad. 
Furthermore the effect of foreign rates of interest on credit depends on the intensity of the foreign 
rates of interest shocks towards income side in contrast to cost from interest in the balance sheet 
of banks of the home country. Conversely, a monetary contraction reduces the amount of credit 
provision by bank, with a delayed response (lag). In addition, both monetary policy of home 
country and interest rate of abroad gives important effect on the provision of domestic credit. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Financial stability is an important element in the development of a country, and the global 
financial crisis has shown the key role of financial intermediation in the stability of an economy, 
and in policy making. (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2008) argued that the newly set up and unregulated or 
lightly regulated  financial entities such as the Sub Prime Mortgage market in the United States 
before the wake of the 2008 global crises had increased vulnerability of the United States financial 
system and intermediation, which resulted into the crises.  Using a UK Bank as an example, (Shin, 
2009)argued that vulnerability in financial intermediation system stemming from institutional 
investor reliance on short term financing has resulted it being prone to negative external financial 
shocks. The Mortgage back securities debacle in The United States has resulted in the wake of 
de-leveraging of the UK and global credit markets, disturbed financial intermediation and resulted 
in the global financial crisis of 2008.  (Claessens, Dell’Ariccia, Igan, & Laeven, 2010) argued that 
new more sophisticated financial intermediaries and instruments and household debts coupled 
with flaws with policy framework and weak supervision of the state of health of the intermediation 
system were at the heart of the global financial crises. In addition this paper argued that although 
monetary policy and micro-prudential policies are necessary but they are not sufficient in 
safeguarding the economy from shocks which may have detrimental effects to the economy.  
Furthermore (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, & Mauro, 2010) argued that financial intermediation 
regulation cannot be left outside the core macroeconomic policy framework because a stalled 
financial intermediary system have detrimental effects on the real economy as shown from the 
global financial crisis. (Adrian & Song Shin, 2010) argued that financial intermediaries is the 
engine of the financial cycle. The financial cycle in turn is at the heart of the risk taking channel 
of monetary policy transmission mechanism.  And (Rey, 2016) argued that the global financial 
crisis has underlined the importance of financial frictions on the monetary policy transmission A
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mechanism (in particular the international transmission mechanism of monetary policy), and 
financial stability. This paper also underlines the importance of financial stability for 
macroeconomic soundness’.  
In developing nations, financial intermediation, especially the banking sector, plays a more 
prominent role in the provision of financing than other financial sectors such as the capital market 
or the bonds market. Based on The Bank for International Settlement’s data, on average, a 
proportion of 79 percent of financing to the private non-financial sector was provided by the 
banking sector in developing countries in the second quarter of 2017. Whereas, the average 
percentage of financing channelled by the banking sector in developed countries which is about 
55 percent. (See tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix). This fact underlines the importance of bank 
credits for developing countries in general, and for a developing country such as Indonesia in 
particular. 
Topics on the relationship between bank credit and monetary policy has been discussed in 
length in the literature. (For some recent examples see (Altunbas, Gambacorta, & Marques-
Ibanez, 2010), (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, & Saurina, 2012), (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, & 
Saurina, 2014), (Bruno & Shin, 2015), (Cúrdia & Woodford, 2016)). A pioneering paper on this 
topic is (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992). This which empirically studied the influence of monetary 
policy on bank credit for the United States, concluded that a rise on the Federal funds rate resulted 
in a fall of bank credit, but with a lag. An extension of this work was conducted by Vera (2012), 
by including more recent data points. (Vera, 2012) obtained similar conclusions but the impact of 
monetary policy on credit has far fallen over the period. This set of literature concludes that a rise 
of the monetary policy rate resulted in a fall of bank credit, but with a lag. 
Globalization has made funds to flow in and out relatively freely to and from countries. Due 
to this development, foreign interest rates may influence economic conditions in developing 
countries. This serves as a challenge for monetary policy making for central banks and monetary 
authorities of developing economies as argued by the following scholars. (di Giovanni & 
Shambaugh, 2008) found that high foreign interest rates results in contraction of the real GDP of 
the domestic economy. This contractionary effect of foreign interest rates on real GDP only exist 
in countries with a fixed exchange rate regime. This serves as a challenge for monetary policy 
making because maintaining the real output gap is one of the objective of monetary policy. 
(Aizenman & Glick, 2009) found that sterilization was widely conducted in Asia and Latin 
America due to worries of hiking inflationary impact of inflows of foreign reserves. (Mishkin, 
2009) argued that globalization did not lead to the decline of the impact of monetary policy stance 
changes on inflation and domestic output gaps. Furthermore this paper found that foreign 
monetary policy (through foreign output gap) did not have an important impact on domestic 
inflation and thus did don’t have the role of demising the potency of domestic monetary policy in 
fighting inflation.  In addition this paper argued that domestic monetary policy have sufficient 
power in controlling domestic interest rate, which is used as the main instrument for controlling 
domestic inflation and output gap. (Bruno & Shin, 2015) found that a contraction of the monetary 
policy stance of the United States results in a decrease in a decrease of international banks’ cross-
country capital flows. This paper argued that this factor partially explains the flow of capital from 
developed countries to developing countries in the 1990-s. In addition (Ghosh, Ostry, & Chamon, 
2016) that in an economy affected by globalization, the optimal policy response of a developing 
country in their attempt to tame inflation and weaken the negative affect of an exchange rate 
disequilibrium is to use a combination of monetary policy and exchange rate interventions.  
Despite the importance of foreign interest rates may have on an economy, discussions on the 
effect of foreign interest rates changes on domestic bank credit in the literature is still very limited. 
One study which focus on the relationship of foreign interest rate and exchange rate on domestic A
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bank credit is (Zanforlin, 2011). This paper studied the relationship between cross country interest 
rates differentials (in this paper it is also termed as foreign funding cost), real exchange rate and 
domestic bank credit to the private sector by employing a panel of annual data of 91 countries 
from the span of 1970 to 2001. This study concluded that there is a negative relationship between 
foreign funding cost and bank credit, while the real exchange rate is positively related with 
domestic bank credit.  
Notwithstanding the importance of the banking sector for the financial landscape of a 
developing economy, and findings on the effect of monetary policy on domestic bank credit, and 
findings on the effect of foreign interest rates on credit provided by banks, there does not exists a 
study which analyse empirically the effect of foreign interest rates shocks together with monetary 
policy shocks on domestic bank credit to the private sector in a cross country analysis of 
developing countries. Thus the current study endeavours to fill this gap in the literature by 
providing a cross country empirical analysis on the effect of foreign interest rates and monetary 
policy on domestic private sector credit from domestic banks in developing economies. 
 
1.1 Literature Review 
The following section provides literature review on the mechanism on how monetary policy 
affects bank credit, and also how foreign rates of interest affects domestic bank credit. The effect 
of monetary policy on bank credit are categorized into three arguments. The three arguments 
presented in this sections are the balance sheets channel and the bank lending channel and the risk 
taking channel. While the mechanism of the effect of foreign interest rates on domestic bank credit 
uses a modified version of the argument of the risk taking channel of monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The first argument presented in the literature review is the balance sheet 
channel. 
1.1.1 Balance Sheet Channel 
The balance sheet channel argument was pioneered by (Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1999). 
This model has been applied and extended in numerous angles. An example of these extensions 
is (Angelopoulou & Gibson, 2009) . This paper found evidence of the balance sheet channel of 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in The United Kingdom.  In addition (Chami & 
Cosimano, 2010) found that the effect of monetary on bank credit with existence of the Basel 
Accord risk-based capital requirements, is evident and worked through  the balance sheet channel. 
(Aysun & Hepp, 2011) found that balance sheet channel transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy is stronger when the assets of the banks’ are securitized. (Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, 
Russo, & Stiglitz, 2010) shown that the balance sheet channel can operate with an element of 
networking of credit. While (Dedola & Lombardo, 2012) found that exposure of foreign countries 
through a balanced sheet which are interconnected provided a strong source of propagation 
mechanism of producing asymmetric shocks across economies.  
In sum the balance sheet channel argues that a monetary policy contraction would increase 
the domestic rate of interest. Rate of interest rise causes a decrease the market value of balance 
sheet of firms. The motivation behind this outcome is due to negative relation concerning bond 
market value and its rate of return (Mishkin, 2013) .  Rate of interest rise would reduce bonds 
market value, hence diminishes firm’s balance sheet’s market value. 
1.1.2 Bank Lending Channel 
This argument was proposed by (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992). Just like the balance sheet 
channel, there are various applications and extensions of the bank lending channel. An example 
of application of the bank lending channel is (Matousek & Sarantis, 2009) . This paper found A
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empirical evidence of the bank lending channel monetary policy transmission mechanism in eight 
Central and Eastern European Countries which are members of the European Union. This paper 
also found that the strength of the bank lending varies among countries and depends on the size 
and liquidity of the banks. While (de Mello & Pisu, 2010) found empirical evidence of the bank 
credit channel monetary policy transmission mechanism in Brazil. While  (Disyatat, 2011) , using 
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, found that the effect of the bank lending channel 
monetary policy transmission mechanism is weaker or stronger depending on the state of health 
of the banking sector. In addition this analysis found that the importance of the bank lending 
channel is enhanced with the greater reliance on market-based funding and in a well-developed 
financial system.   
In sum, the discussion of the bank lending channel is the following. A monetary contraction 
raises domestic interest rates, which reduces bank’s balance sheets values used for reserves. This 
would induce banks to decrease new and existing credit provision to firms. Ultimately this results 
in reduction of bank credit, but with a lag. In sum this arguments stipulates that a monetary 
contraction results in a fall in bank credit but with a lag. 
 
1.1.3 The Risk Taking Channel 
The last discussion of theory on how monetary policy affects bank credit is the Risk Taking 
Channel argued by (Adrian & Song Shin, 2010) . (Borio & Zhu, 2012)  found that alterations and 
innovations in the financial system and prudential rules had raised the significance of the risk 
taking channel of monetary policy transmission mechanism. This paper also argued that the 
increased in prominence of the risk taking channel has the possibility of increasing the likelihood 
of the occurrence of business cycle fluctuation which may have detrimental effects towards the 
economy.  (Angeloni, Faia, & Lo Duca, 2015) shown the existence of the risk taking channel of 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. This paper found that an expansionary monetary stance 
enhances the risk and the leverage of domestic banks. Furthermore, the monetary expansion 
resulted in banks taking higher risk, and the possibility of surges of the volatility of asset prices. 
While using confidential data of internal ratings of banks on businesses loans (Dell’ariccia, 
Laeven, & Suarez, 2017) found empirical evidence of the risk taking channel of monetary policy 
transmission mechanism in the banking system of the United States. The found a negative 
relationship between short-term interest rates and the degree of risk taking (and thus the amount 
of bank credit). 
In their argument, Adrian and Shin (2011), used the concepts Net Interest Margin and term 
spread. Net Interest Margin (NIM) is total interest income on the bank’s balance sheet asset side 
minus the interest expense on the liabilities side. It governs profitability of total bank lending, 
present value of bank’s income and capital. While term spread is the determinant of profitability 
of credit to the private non-financial sector, on the margin added to bank’s the balance sheet, 
which in turn affects future NIM. 
1.2 Domestic Bank Credit and Foreign Interest Rate 
In discussing the impact of foreign interest rates on quantity of bank credit, I employ a 
modified version of the Risk Taking Channel discussed earlier. The discussion is as follows. 
Assume that the banking system in the small open developing economy holds foreign assets in 
their balance sheet. Assume also that they take foreign borrowing. Suppose due to some external 
shock results in foreign interest rates to increase. Following the discussion of the Risk Taking 
Channel, I argue that if the increase causes the total interest income to fall short of total interest 
cost in bank’s balance sheet. In turn this cause NIM to fall, which ultimately result in a fall of the 
size of domestic bank credit provision to the private sector. On the other hand suppose the rise in A
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foreign interest rates instead augments total interest income by more than total interest cost in 
bank’s balance sheet. This would augment NIM and thus ultimately the sum of domestic bank 
credits expands. 
2. RESEARCH METHODS 
This paper employs the Structural Vector Autoregressive model (SVAR). The SVAR model 
consists of eight variables which can be specified in the following vector.  
 , , , , , , ,1 t t tt t t t ttopw rf ip cpi rdom er crm
'
tY    (1) 
The first three variables in the vector above are 
t
opw  which denotes world oil prices, 
t
rf  
denotes the Federal Funds rate (which I use as to represent rates of interest of foreign) and 
t
ip
denotes industrial production correspondingly. The next three variables in the above vector are 
consumer price index
t
cpi , base money 1tm  and domestic short term interest rates trdom  
respectively. While the remaining two variables in the aforementioned vector are the nominal 
exchange rate denoted as
ter , and credit provision by banks to the non-financial private sector 
denoted as
tcr  correspondingly. 
In general, the model in structural form with p  number of lags can be written as the 
following. 
= + + +...+ +
t t-1 t-2 t-p0 1 2 p tC C C C νY k Y Y Y     (2) 
Denoting
tY as an (n x 1) vector, k is a (n x 1) vector of constants, tν is an (n x 1) vector 
of structural shocks. The structural shocks 
tν are serially and mutually uncorrelated. The 
contemporaneous matrix 
0C is be defined as the following. 
   
   
0 0
12 1
0 0
1 1
1
1
n
n n
c c
c c
  
 
 
  
 
 
   
0C       (3) 
Whereas the matrix
sC is a matrix of dimension (n x n) which the rowk and column l element 
of the matrix is
 r
klc  for r = 1, 2, …, p. 
Given the existence of the inverse matrix
-1
0C , the above structural model can be modified 
by pre-multiplying equation (2) above to get the following result. 
A
CC
EP
TE
D
 M
A
N
U
SC
RI
PT
6 
 ...     
-1 -1 -1 -1 -1
t t-1 t-2 t-po o 1 o 2 o p o tC C C C C C C C νY k Y Y Y   (4) 
Rewrite equation (4) into the following form. 
...     
t t-1 t-2 t-p0 t1 2 p
φ φ φd eY Y Y Y      (5)     
where the above matrix/vectors are defined as the following. 

-1
0 od C k          (6) 

-1
o jj
φ C C  for j = 1, 2,…p.       (7) 

-1
t o te C ν .         (8) 
Equation 4 is the structural dynamic model, while equation 5 is the structural model in 
reduced form and the vector
te are reduced form residuals. The relationship between the structural 
shocks and the reduced form residuals can be written in the following equation. 
 
t o tν C e          (9)    
Equation 9 implies, identification of the structural shocks is dependent on the 
contemporaneous matrix
0C .In identifying the structural shocks, I employ the strategy from 
literature (see Kim and Roubini (2000)) and extend it to include domestic credit. The strategy for 
identifying the shocks is presented in the following matrix. 
21
31
41 43
1
53 54 56
61 65 67 68
71 72 73 74 75 76
81 82 83 84 85 86 87
0 0 0 0 0 0 01
0 0 0 0 0 01
0 0 0 0 0 01
0 0 0 0 01
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   
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e
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 
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 
 
The countries used in this study is based on availability of data. The data used in this study 
are of monthly frequency for India from June 1997 to September 2015, Mexico from January 
1997 to September 2015, Chile from January 1998 to October 2015, South Africa from January 
1986 to November 2015 and Turkey from February 2002 to November 2015. These data are 
obtained from the OECD data base except for data on domestic bank credit which was acquired 
from the central banks of each country. Using the Akaike Information Criterion  (Doan, 2013), 
13 lags is found to be appropriate for the above model. A
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
In analysing the response of bank credit due to shocks to monetary policy and foreign interest 
I employ Impulse Response Analysis functions. In examining the Impulse Response functions F 
I use the Bayesian Monte Carlo Integration approach in RATS statistical package. Using 90 
percent confidence bands, this package draws 10,000 replications by using the Random Walk 
Metropolis Hastings method (see Doan (2013)). 
The IRF analysis for a one percent rise in foreign interest rates (denoted as rf), is depicted in 
figures 1 to 6 in the appendix, and the discussion is as follows. This shock results in a one percent 
increase of the country’s private non-financial sectors’ provision of domestic bank credit. 
Whereas its response is 0.6 percent and 0.5 percent for Colombia and India respectively. And in 
Turkey, and South Africa bank credit also rose although not significant. (see  figures 1 to 5 in the 
appendix) 
The reason for the above results follows from the Risk taking channel argument. Following 
the argument of Adrian and Shin (2011). The argument on how foreign interest rates affects bank 
credit using the risk taking channel is as follows. Given that the banking system in a small open 
developing economy holds foreign assets in their balance sheet. Assume also that they take 
foreign borrowing. Suppose due to some external shock results in foreign interest rates to increase. 
Following the discussion of the Risk Taking Channel, if the rise in foreign interest rates causes 
total interest income to increase by more than the rise of total interest cost in bank’s balance sheet, 
this cause the Nett Interest Margin of supplying new credit by the bank to rise. Ultimately the rise 
in foreign interest rate would result in a rise of the size of domestic bank credit provision to the 
private sector. Given that firm s are financially constrained, this results in an increase in domestic 
bank credit.  
In addition, given that firms have sufficient time to adjust their balance sheet, I argue that this 
result is partially also be due to banks and firms having sufficient time to adjust and substitute 
away from the more costly foreign credit to domestic bank credit. The combination of the 
increased supply of domestic bank credit by domestic banks plus the increase in demand of 
domestic credit by domestic firm resulted in the increase of domestic bank credit in the economy.    
On the other hand, the one percent increase in foreign interest rates in Chile caused the 
quantity of credit to fall. The reason for this case is that the rise in foreign interest rates increased 
total interest income but by less than total interest cost in bank’s balance sheet. This would 
decrease NIM and ultimately reduce the sum of domestic bank credit (see figure 6 at the appendix) 
The reason for the above result is consistent with the results found by Bruno and Shin, (2015). 
In that paper it is found that a contraction of the monetary policy stance of large foreign country 
resulted in a decrease in the flows foreign capital channelled by international banks’ to domestic 
banks of the developing country. The reduction of the foreign capital inflow in turn would have 
an impact of reducing funds available for domestic banks of the developing country that can be 
used for lending. Ultimately the monetary contraction of the central bank of the large foreign 
country would decrease the amount of domestic credit in the developing country. As a note Bruno 
and Shin, (2015) had shown that this mechanism on how foreign interest rates affects domestic 
bank credit, explains partially the flow of capital from developed countries to developing A
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countries in the 1990-s. Furthermore result finding of the decline of domestic bank credit due to 
the rise of the foreign interest rate is also in line with result found by (Zanforlin, 2011). This paper 
found that an increase in foreign interest rates results in an increase in foreign funding cost. In 
turn the increase in foreign funding cost results in a fall of the source of funding for domestic 
banks which can be channelled to domestic borrowers. In the end the rise in foreign interest rate 
would result in a fall of domestic bank credit.  
 For the Impulse Response Analysis of monetary policy shocks, a monetary tightening which 
result a one percent rise of interest rate of the home economy. For the countries in the study, the 
Impulse response Functions shows that the rise in home interest rate causes the sum of bank credit 
to decline, but with a lag. However, the fall of domestic bank credit due to a monetary contraction 
is only significant for Mexico (see figure 7 of the appendix). For India, Chile, Turkey, Colombia 
and South Africa, a monetary contraction results is a fall in domestic bank credit, but it is not 
statistically significant.  
This fall in domestic bank credit due to a monetary policy contraction is in line with the 
conclusion found by bank lending channel monetary policy transmission mechanism put forward 
by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and verified by (Vera, 2012), although this paper showed that 
the impact of the bank credit monetary policy transmission mechanism has weakened as compared 
to the 1990s. 
The non-significance of the effect of monetary policy on domestic bank credit  as shown from 
the Impulse Response Function graphs for India, Chile, Turkey, Colombia and South Africa 
indicates that monetary policy is less appropriate tool in manage the growth of bank credit in 
Indonesia to safeguard the health and soundness of the financial system.   
In addition to Impulse Response Analysis, this study also employs analyses the Forecast 
Variance Error Decomposition. The Forecast Variance Error Decomposition measures the 
proportion of variation of an endogenous variable in the model due to various shocks included in 
the model. In sum, the magnitude of the Forecast Variance Error Decompositions provide 
measurement of the strength of the influence of each shocks on the corresponding endogenous 
variable in the model  (Barnett, Bhadury, & Ghosh, 2016). 
The information for the Forecast Variance Error Decomposition analysis was obtained from 
the research output and is presented in tables 1, 2 and 3 below. The first to notice of the results is 
that the percentage variation of monetary policy shocks on domestic bank credit is small in all 
countries, with the exception of India. On impact, the percentage variation of domestic bank credit 
due to the monetary policy shock is about 2 percent for Chile, less than 2 percent for Colombia 
and Mexico and is less than 1 percent for Turkey and South Africa. However, on impact, the 
percentage variation of domestic bank credit due to the monetary policy shock for India is a bit 
over 10 percent, but it subsequently fell. The magnitude of variation of monetary shocks on 
domestic bank credit for Chile, Colombia, Turkey, India and South Africa remains below four 
percent even after 12 months. This results indicates that monetary policy is not very potent 
instrument in influencing domestic bank credit. This result is in line with the finding of Vera 
(2012), in which this paper found that the strength of the bank lending channel had waned in the 
United States. Considering the results obtained from the estimation, a further question that can be 
posed is why has the monetary policy on domestic bank credit in developing countries had 
weakened? One answer that can offered for this question, is that it is due to financial development 
and financial innovations.  Altunbas, Gambacorta and Marques-Ibanez (2010) found that financial 
innovations resulted in weaker influence of monetary policy on bank credit. As found by this 
paper, advancements in  financial innovations (such as credit derivatives and securitizations of A
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assets) enables banks to give out new loans and sell them in the financial market thus obtaining 
additional liquidity and relaxing constraints in the capital requirement in generating new loans.  
Table.1. 
Months 
Chile Colombia 
standard error rf rdom standard error rf rdom 
1 0.825 3.226 2.041 0.507 3.454 1.949 
3 1.377 8.769 0.958 1.042 6.759 1.322 
4 1.553 8.155 0.893 1.3 8.684 1.444 
6 1.844 9.846 0.696 1.856 14.523 0.799 
12 2.751 6.983 1.986 3.171 16.866 1.618 
24 4.171 4.195 1.101 5.451 11.356 0.806 
48 7.22 6.964 1.979 9.69 5.759 6.585 
72 13.936 16.1 6.846 16.447 10.406 3.329 
Source: RATS output 
 
 
Table.2. 
Months 
Turkey India 
standard error rf rdom standard error rf rdom 
1 0.651 5.137 0.099 1.023 0.015 10.055 
3 1.106 3.132 0.336 1.589 1.318 8.471 
4 1.355 2.698 0.241 1.784 3.512 6.966 
6 1.798 1.554 0.171 2.098 8.577 5.154 
12 2.879 6.576 3.694 2.886 11.703 3.419 
24 4.119 7.338 6.049 4.385 11.725 2.402 
48 5.913 6.664 11.002 6.484 5.894 3.650 
72 7.041 5.8 9.862 8.211 3.865 2.867 
Source: RATS output 
 
 
Table.3. 
Months 
Mexico South Africa 
standard error rf rdom standard error rf rdom 
1 0.785 0.013 1.123 12.775 0.024 0.926 
3 1.269 0.875 6.766 13.656 0.888 0.95 
4 1.513 5.086 8.084 14.318 1.208 1.014 
6 1.93 10.07 6.09 14.652 1.221 1.827 
12 3.626 19.73 10.797 15.733 2.881 2.182 
24 7.255 29.561 15.599 17.73 5.609 3.59 
48 10.249 27.414 15.69 19.395 7.093 4.733 
72 11.583 22.282 20.023 19.928 7.302 5.076 
Source: RATS output A
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In addition tables 1 to 3 shows that foreign interest rates can influence on domestic bank 
credit, and its influence can be more important than monetary policy. As shown in tables 1 to 3 
above, the variation of bank credit to non-financial private sectors vis-à-vis monetary policy 
dominates foreign interest rates on the first month only in India, Mexico and South Africa. While 
for Chile, Colombia and Turkey the variation of bank credit to non-financial private sectors due 
to foreign interest rates is larger than monetary policy shocks. Yet after 6 months, for India and 
Mexico and after 12 months for South Africa, the variation of the Federal Funds rate surpass that 
of monetary policy of the domestic developing country. The reason for this result is that it may 
be due to the the result of increased globalization which makes many nations including developing 
countries to be more integrated the global financial market. This argument is in line with 
Claessens et al. (2010). In relation to this argument,  Bruno and Shin, (2015) had shown that the 
impact of a change in monetary policy stance of the United States is transmitted globally and 
influences the flow of capital in other nations, 
The last result above suggests that in addition to monetary policy, foreign interest rates also 
has an important influence on banks’ credit in developing countries. This is a novel finding and 
contribution of the paper to the literature of economics; both monetary policy and foreign interest 
rates influences bank credit in developing countries. In addition the results indicates that monetary 
policy stance of central banks of developing countries influences bank credit only up to 6 or at 
most 12 months. After 12 months, foreign interest rates dominates. In addition from the impulse 
response functions it is shown that the impact of the change of the monetary policy stance of the 
central banks of developing countries does not significantly affect domestic bank credit in these 
countries.. On the other hand the Impulse Response Analysis shows that foreign interest rates 
have a significant effect on bank credit. These results underlines that monetary policy is less 
effective as a tool to be used in managing the growth of bank credit. This result is in line with the 
finding by (Vera, 2012). Therefore monetary policy is not effective for nurturing the stability of 
the financial system of developing countries. To oversee the growth of bank credit, 
macroprudential policies should instead be used in the effort to maintain the soundness of 
Indonesia’s financial landscape. In addition authorities in charge of macroprudential policies 
should take into account the effect of foreign interest rates and also financial innovation in 
formulating and implementing the policies.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Contributing to the relatively sparse literature on how monetary policy and foreign interest 
can influence bank credit. And by employing a structural VAR model on six developing countries, 
this paper concluded that domestic credit provided by banks in home country is affected by 
interest rates from abroad. And its effect on credit depends on the intensity of the foreign shock’s 
influence towards income in contrast to cost from interest in the balance sheet of banks of the 
home country. Conversely, a monetary contraction reduces the amount of credit provision by 
bank, with a delayed response. However monetary policy has no significant effect on domestic 
bank credit. These novel findings of the paper underlines that monetary policy is less effective as 
a tool in managing credit growth. Other policies such as macroprudential polices should instead 
be used in the effort to guard the stability of the financial system of developing countries. 
Furthermore, in formulating and conducting macroprudential policies, the central banks of 
developing countries should take into account the effect of foreign interest rates on domestic bank 
credit. And both monetary policy of home country and interest rate of abroad gives important 
effect on the provision of domestic credit. This result provides support to the argument that 
conventional monetary policy have limited ability to manage credit growth and promote financial 
stability.  
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7. Appendixes. 
Table A1: Credit of Banking Sector to Total Financing in Developing Countries  
 
Country 
Year/Quarter 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Q1 17 Q2 17 
     Argentina 75% 78% 78% 79% 76% 75% 75% 75% 
     Brazil 95% 95% 93% 93% 94% 94% 94% 94% 
     China 82% 79% 75% 74% 76% 75% 75% 75% 
     Malaysia 97% 100% 100% 98% 97% 97% 97% 96% 
     Mexico 47% 48% 47% 45% 45% 44% 45% 46% 
     Hungary 43% 40% 38% 36% 35% 36% 36% 37% 
     India 93% 92% 92% 93% 93% 94% 95% 95% 
     Indonesia 93% 92% 89% 88% 86% 88% 89% 88% 
     Greece 89% 87% 89% 89% 88% 86% 86% 86% 
     Thailand 98% 99% 97% 96% 96% 96% 97% 97% 
     Turkey 84% 88% 89% 89% 74% 72% 73% 74% 
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     Poland 67% 65% 65% 64% 64% 63% 63% 64% 
     Saudi Arabia 90% 97% 95% 95% 92% 92% 91% 91% 
     South Africa 97% 95% 93% 94% 91% 91% 90% 90% 
average for 
developing countries 
81% 82% 80% 80% 79% 79% 79% 79% 
Source: Bank for international settlement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Credit of Banking Sector to Total Financing in Developed Countries  
 
Country 
Year/Quarter 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Q1 17 Q2 17 
     United Kingdom 58% 55% 56% 56% 54% 53% 53% 54% 
     United States 33% 33% 33% 33% 34% 35% 34% 34% 
     Canada 51% 53% 53% 52% 51% 52% 52% 51% 
     Australia 70% 69% 68% 68% 69% 71% 71% 71% 
     Austria 64% 63% 61% 59% 59% 59% 58% 59% 
     Belgium 27% 26% 27% 28% 29% 29% 29% 29% 
     Czech Republic 59% 58% 56% 56% 55% 58% 58% 58% 
     Denmark 72% 72% 74% 74% 75% 77% 78% 78% 
     Finland 53% 53% 52% 53% 49% 53% 53% 52% 
     France 54% 53% 53% 51% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
     Germany 75% 75% 73% 72% 72% 72% 71% 71% 
     Italy 75% 72% 71% 71% 73% 72% 72% 72% 
     Japan 63% 65% 67% 67% 69% 68% 69% 69% 
     Korea 71% 69% 67% 67% 67% 68% 69% 69% 
     Netherlands 50% 52% 51% 49% 48% 48% 48% 48% 
     Norway 35% 33% 33% 33% 31% 32% 32% 32% 
     Spain 74% 72% 69% 67% 66% 65% 64% 64% 
     Sweden 56% 57% 57% 56% 55% 56% 56% 57% 
     Switzerland 76% 77% 77% 77% 79% 79% 79% 79% 
     Luxembourg 21% 20% 21% 23% 22% 24% 24% 25% 
     Ireland 36% 36% 35% 29% 16% 16% 17% 18% 
     Portugal 69% 65% 64% 62% 60% 60% 59% 59% A
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     Russia 76% 79% 78% 76% 76% 76% 76% 76% 
average for 
developed countries 57% 56% 56% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 
 Source: Bank for international settlement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Response to foreign interest rate shocks for Mexico 
 
Source: RATS output 
 
Figure 2. Response to foreign interest rate shocks for Colombia 
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Source: RATS output 
 
Figure 3. Response to foreign interest rate shocks for India 
 
Source: RATS output 
 
Figure 4. Response to foreign interest rate shocks for Turkey 
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Source: RATS output 
 
Figure 5. Response to foreign interest rate shocks for South Africa 
 
Source: RATS output 
 
Figure 6. Response to foreign interest rate shocks for Chile 
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Source: RATS output 
 
Figure 7. Response to monetary policy shocks for Mexico 
 
Source: RATS output 
 
Figure 8. Response to monetary policy shocks for Turkey 
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Source: RATS output 
 
Figure 9. Response to monetary policy shocks for Chile 
 
Source: research results 
 
Figure 10. Response to monetary policy shocks for Colombia 
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Figure 11. Response to monetary policy shocks for India 
 
Figure 12. Response to monetary policy shocks for South Africa 
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